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The Criminalization of Immigration and
the International Norm of
Non-Discrimination: Deportation and
Detention in U.S. Immigration Law
Barbara A. Freyt & X. Kevin Zhaott
Introduction
The Law and Inequality Fall 2010 Symposium focused on the
growing use of criminal prosecutions to end impunity for human
rights violations. This Article takes a different look at the
intersection between criminal justice and human rights law-not a
view of the criminalization of human rights violations, but
criminalization as a human rights violation. We review the
human rights implications of U.S. immigration law as it is
currently codified and enforced, focusing specifically on two
aspects of the immigration law regime: the use of deportation and
mandatory detention against non-citizens.' Although we believe
that these practices in particular, and the treatment of non-
citizens in general, fall short of several of the United States'
international human rights obligations, this Article makes a more
general claim: the selective convergence of criminal and
immigration law contributes to a violation of a broader human
rights norm-that citizens and non-citizens alike are entitled to
equal dignity and inalienable rights, and that any discriminatory
treatment of non-citizens must be proportional to achieving a
legitimate state objective.2
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the growing
t. Barbara A. Frey, J.D., is Director of the Human Rights Program at the
University of Minnesota and serves as the Convener of the Midwest Coalition for
Human Rights. Professor Frey participated in the Law & Inequality Symposium
"International Wrongs, International Rights: The Use of Criminal Law to Protect
Human Rights," September 28, 201, University of Minnesota Law School, as a
panelist discussing the modern manifestations of international human rights law.
tt. X. Kevin Zhao is an associate at Faegre & Benson LLP. He graduated from
Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, in 2010. He would like to thank his
parents, who immigrated to the United States when he was a child, for their
sacrifices over the years, and his wife, Michelle Collins Zhao, for her insights and
support.
1. See infra Parts III-IV.
2. See infra Part II.
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convergence between criminal and immigration law, noting the
"asymmetrical" character of this trend. Part II reviews important
international human rights instruments elaborating the rights of
non-citizens, and sets forth what we believe to be a broad
normative obligation of general equality between citizens and non-
citizens. We call this obligation the "non-discrimination norm."
Part III discusses the non-discrimination norm in the context of
the current deportation regime, which is both categorical and
harsh. Continuing this idea, Part IV analyzes another important
manifestation of the growing convergence between criminal and
immigration law: mandatory immigration detention. Although we
review statutory authority for detention and Supreme Court
jurisprudence, our principal objective is to demonstrate how
mandatory detention violates the non-discrimination norm
emanating from international law.
I. The Criminalization of Immigration
The nativist sentiments in U.S. culture have arisen with
particular fervor in the past two decades. The rise in anti-
immigrant rhetoric, trumpeted by interest groups and sympathetic
media, has all but solidified the ideological construction of large
groups of immigrants as "illegal" with all of the moral stigma that
accompanies that term.' National security fears and economic
instability have increased demands for more aggressive
enforcement of immigration laws, not only to prevent more
3. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 500 (2007)
("Much of the recent immigration enforcement-related activity at the federal, state,
and local levels reflects ... perceived associations of immigrants with criminals.");
see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1835-39 (2007) [hereinafter
Chac6n, Unsecured Borders] (discussing the construction of the "illegal alien" in
public discourse). Public perception on this issue is wrong. Most immigration into
the United States occurs through legal channels. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 14,
241 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/
1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf (reporting that in 1999, 646,568 immigrants were
admitted for legal permanent resident status compared to an annual estimated
increase of 275,000 undocumented immigrants). Studies have consistently found
that crime rates of the immigrant population are substantially lower than those of
the native-born population, despite the immigrant population being younger and
less educated. See Rubdn G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant
Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men,
MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (June 2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/
Feature/display.cfm?id=403. This conclusion holds true even if one does not control
for age, gender, or educational attainment. See Kristin F. Butcher & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Cross-City Evidence on the Relationship Between Immigration and
Crime, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 457, 483-84 (1998); Rumbaut et al., supra.
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immigrants from arriving, but to drive away the ones who are
here.' Given this context, it should not be a surprise that the
landscape of immigration law has changed dramatically as the
traditional boundaries between the criminal and immigration
spheres have eroded.'
Legal scholars have termed this once gradual but now
accelerated blurring as the "criminalization of immigration law."'
The convergence of criminal and immigration law has occurred on
at least three fronts as Congress has (1) increased the number of
immigration-related criminal offenses as well as the severity of
punishment, (2) expanded the number of criminal offenses that
require deportation, and (3) delegated more immigration
enforcement to state and local law enforcement officers.
A. Immigration-Related Criminal Offenses
Violations of immigration law were historically civil offenses.'
Until 1929, when Congress made illegal entry into the United
States a misdemeanor and illegal re-entry a felony, the violation of
immigration laws was not a crime.' Beginning in the mid-1980s,
with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Congress
began to increase the number of immigration-related criminal
offenses.' For the first time, IRCA imposed criminal penalties on
employers who engage in a "pattern or practice" of knowingly
hiring non-citizens who are unauthorized to work.o Congress also
created criminal sanctions for employees who use fraudulent
documents to secure employment." The Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments criminalized marriages that are entered into
for the purpose of gaining immigration status." Subsequent
congressional enactments criminalized unlawful re-entry following
4. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 3, at 1830.
5. Id. at 1839-43.
6. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 639, 640 (2004); Legomsky, supra note 3, at 476; Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship
and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 611, 617 (2003).
7. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 384 (2006) [hereinafter Stumpf, Crimmi-
gration Crisis].
8. Id.
9. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2006).




three or more enumerated misdemeanors (generally drug crimes
or crimes against persons)," entrepreneurship fraud in the
immigration setting," traffic offenses while evading immigration
checkpoints," failure to disclose one's role in assisting fraudulent
immigration applications," and falsely representing oneself to be a
U.S. citizen to obtain certain immigration benefits."
Congress also increased the severity of punishments, both
fines and length of imprisonment, for existing immigration-related
crimes. For example, the maximum prison sentence for persons
who unlawfully re-enter the United States following deportation
increased from two years to twenty years as Congress revisited the
issue three times in less than a decade (1988, 1994, and 1996)."
Immigration-related prosecutions quadrupled from 1996 to 2006,"
accounting for more than thirty percent of all federal prosecutions
and constituting the single largest category of federal prosecutions
(more than drug- or weapon-related offenses).2 o
B. Criminal Offenses Triggering Deportation
In addition to lengthening the list of immigration-related
criminal offenses, Congress expanded the number of criminal
convictions that trigger deportation and other adverse
immigration consequences.2 ' This trend is sometimes dubbed
"immigrationization of criminal law."" There are myriad ways
that a criminal conviction can adversely affect a non-citizen's
immigration status. It may result in a non-citizen being denied
admission into the country.23 If a non-citizen is already in the
country, a conviction may result in deportation"' and the
13. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 130001(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2006).
14. Immigration Act of 1990 § 121(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(d) (2006).
15. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 108, 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2006).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e) (2006).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e)-(f) (2006).
18. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 478; Stumpf, Crimmigration Crisis, supra
note 7, at 384.
19. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 135, 139 (2009), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/
assets/sidebar/volume/109/135_Chacon.pdf [hereinafter Chac6n, Managing
Migration].
20. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 479-80.
21. Miller, supra note 6, at 614.
22. Id. at 618.
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) (setting forth eligibility categories for
admission).
24. See id. § 1227(a)(2).
282 [Vol. 29:279
2011] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION
elimination of discretionary avenues of relief for staying
deportation." A conviction also triggers mandatory immigration
detention pending a deportation decision, which may take months
or years.2 ' This Article focuses only on deportation and mandatory
detention. As discussed below, while Congress created new
immigration-related crimes, it steadily expanded the crimes
resulting in mandatory detention and deportation, primarily
through expansion of the term "aggravated felony.""
C. Increased Immigration Enforcement by State and Local
Police
For purposes of this Article, the final point of intersection
between criminal and immigration law occurs at the level of actual
law enforcement. Over the last two decades, state and local police
have been playing an ever-increasing role in immigration enforce-
ment, even though immigration regulation is, as the Supreme
Court has made clear, "unquestionably exclusively a federal
power."28 In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which, among
other things, authorized the Attorney General to enter into colla-
borative agreements with local and state law enforcement offi-
cials.29 Under these written agreements, also called "287(g) agree-
ments," state and local police gain access to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases and are authorized to inde-
pendently investigate and initiate removal proceedings.o As of
this Article, seventy-one local and state law enforcement agencies
in twenty-six states have entered into 287(g) agreements.31
25. See id. § 1229b(a)(3) (disallowing cancellation of removal if the non-citizen
has been convicted of an aggravated felony).
26. Id. § 1226(c)(1); see infra Part IV.A.
27. See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 3, at 1843-44; Legomsky, supra
note 3, at 483-86; Stumpf, Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 7, at 382-84; infra
Part III.A.
28. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1088-89 (2004).
29. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 133 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 287, 8
U.S.C. § 1357 (1994)).
30. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE
AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAws 7 (2009), available at
httpf//www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf.
31. See Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE's 287(g) Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION
& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-
reform.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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The adoption of Arizona Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, the "Support
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act," in April 2010
constituted a further action by a state government to involve itself
in policing the flow of unauthorized aliens into its territory.3 2 The
most controversial provisions of S.B. 1070 make it mandatory for
police to verify the immigration status of persons suspected to be
in the country unlawfully during the course of a "lawful stop,
detention or arrest"' and require the immigration status of every
arrested individual to be verified before each individual is
released.' The law also creates several new immigration-related
state crimes, including criminal sanctions for aliens who solicit or
obtain work without authorization" or who fail to carry federal
immigration documents." Even though the constitutionality of
Arizona's law is being contested by the U.S. Department of
Justice," it is clear that states will continue to push to use their
police powers to criminalize and enforce immigration laws. As of
November 2010, copycat legislation had "been introduced in six
state legislatures: South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
Rhode Island, Michigan and Illinois.""
The policy arguments for state and local enforcement of
immigration laws, as well as the constitutionality of such actions,
are beyond the scope of this Article. We touch on these issues
mainly to illustrate the ways that traditional criminal justice is
converging with immigration enforcement in the United States.
D. "Asymmetric Incorporation""
Although the boundaries between criminal and immigration
law have eroded, the incorporation of the criminal justice model
into immigration law (and vice-versa) has not been wholesale.
Rather, criminal law has been selectively and asymmetrically
projected onto the civil regulatory regime of immigration law. 0
More precisely, while immigration law has become focused on
32. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.
azleg.gov/alispdfs/council/SB1070-HB2162.PDF.
33. Id. § 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 5.
36. Id. § 3.
37. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010).
38. Ann Morse, Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISIATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20263 (last modified Nov.
10, 2010).
39. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 469.
40. See id. at 527-28.
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traditionally criminal norms and theories such as incapacitation
and deterrence, the adjudicatory mechanism in immigration law
remains civil, thus eschewing the procedural protections of the
criminal justice system and its accompanying constitutional and
sub-constitutional constraints."'
For example, despite the harshness of the sanction of
deportation, the legal proceedings for determining deportability
are still civil in nature, with minimal procedural protections."'
Similarly, prolonged detention in jail or prison (as the non-citizen's
case moves between an immigration judge, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the U.S. Court of Appeals) is
deemed non-punitive and detainees seldom have the opportunity
to live in the community while they await rulings in their
immigration cases.' For over a century, the touchstone of U.S.
immigration law has been that deportation is not a punishment,
regardless of the impact on the deportees or their families."
Therefore, in terms of adjudicative procedure, whereas the
criminal defendant is afforded the constitutional protections
enshrined in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, the non-citizen facing deportation has only the
protection of the Due Process Clause," and even that protection is
limited in the immigration detention context." The exclusionary
rule" does not apply in "civil" deportation proceedings," nor do the
Federal Rules of Evidence." The non-citizen also has no privilege
against self-incrimination," no right to counsel at the
41. Id. at 472. Even in the criminal sphere, procedural protections for criminal
defendants charged with immigration-related crimes are beginning to erode. See
Chac6n, Managing Migration, supra note 19, at 141-45 (noting that it is not
uncommon for appointed defense counsel to represent dozens of defendants at the
same time during criminal prosecutions for unlawful entry).
42. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 472.
43. See Chac6n, Managing Migration, supra note 19, at 141.
44. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see also Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
45. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903); Stumpf,
Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 7, at 390-95.
46. See infra Part IV.B.
47. The exclusionary rule is the "general rule in a criminal proceeding ... that
statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless
arrest are suppressible if the link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is
not too attenuated." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1984) (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963)).
48. Id. at 1050.
49. Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990).
50. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923)
("[Tihere is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration
of the immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of one who is
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government's expense," no argument under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment," and
no protection against the retroactive application of deportation
laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause." The rest of this Article
discusses the human rights implications of the selective and
asymmetric convergence of criminal and immigration law.
II. Human Rights Instruments and the Non-Discrimination
Norm
Many human rights organizations, legal scholars, and even
United Nations (U.N.) bodies have meticulously documented how
U.S. immigration law violates international human rights
treaties."4 While such projects are extremely valuable, our
called upon to speak."); Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony
and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 623-
36 (1990).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). According to the Department of Justice, in 2007
nearly sixty percent of non-citizens in removal proceedings appeared without
counsel. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY
2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation
for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A
Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 541-43 (2009).
52. Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999).
53. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952) (finding that
because deportation is civil, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the
retroactive application of the Alien Registration Act of 1940).
54. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and
Political Rights, Including Questions of Torture and Detention: Opinions Adopted
by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 21/2005, 73, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/7/Add.1 (May 27, 2005) (concluding that the U.S. government's
treatment of immigrant Mr. Ahmed Ali did not conform with the "norms and
principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)); U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions
of Torture and Detention: Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Opinion No. 33/1999, 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 (Dec. 1, 1999)
(finding that the U.S. government's treatment of immigrant C6sar Manuel Guzmdn
Cruz did not conform with the UDHR or the ICCPR); ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, NINTH
SESSION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE UPR HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: MIGRANTS,
REFUGEES, AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 4 (2010), available at http://lib.ohchr.org/
HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/USfUSHRNUPRUSAS09_2010 Annexl6_
Migrants%20Refugees%20and%2OAsylum%20Seekers.pdf (recommending reforms
to the U.S. immigration system to ensure compliance with the ICCPR); HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION,
FINDING PRISON 33 (2009), available at http://idcoalition.org/wp-content/-
uploads/2009/03/090429-rp-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf ("[T]he U.S. detention
system lacks safeguards that prevent detention from being arbitrary within the
meaning of the ICCPR . . . ."); MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL.,
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objective in this Article is to highlight a broader normative ideal
grounded in principles of equality, necessity, and proportionality.
In 2003, David Weissbrodt, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of
non-citizens for the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, concluded that "[iun general,
international human rights law requires the equal treatment of
citizens and non-citizens."" Although nations may create legal
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, such distinctions
are only permissible if they "serve a legitimate State objective and
are proportional to the achievement of that objective."56 We refer
to this concept as the non-discrimination norm.
A. Survey of Human Rights Instruments
We start our review of important human rights instruments
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
Although the UDHR is not itself legally binding and does not
specifically single out non-citizens for protection, it articulates an
important normative vision of "equal and inalienable rights" for
"all members of the human family."" Additionally, the UDHR
influences many of the subsequent binding treaties that affect the
rights of non-citizens." The enumerated list of prohibited grounds
of discrimination set forth in article 2 does not specifically prohibit
a state from drawing distinctions based on citizenship or
immigration status." That does not mean, however, that non-
citizens are outside the scope of the UDHR's vision for equality.
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 3 (2006) (identifying
numerous U.S. violations of Article 13 of the ICCPR); Michelle Brand & Christiana
Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the Rights of Immigration
Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2008) (arguing that U.S. policies and practices regarding the
detention of asylum seekers violate the ICCPR).
55. Special Rapporteur, Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Non-
Citizens, 1 1, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n
on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23
(May 26, 2003).
56. Id.
57. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc
A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.orglen/documents/udhr/
index.shtml [hereinafter UDHR] (proclaiming itself to be "a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations"); see also Ryszard Cholewinski, The
Human and Labor Rights of Migrants: Visions of Equality, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
177, 177-78 (2008) ("[T]he UDHR underlines the importance of the application of
this equality principle for the realization of freedom, justice, and peace.").
58. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that the treaty is drafted
"in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights").
59. UDHR, supra note 57, art. 2.
287
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The use of "such as" in article 2 of the UDHR indicates that the
list of prohibited grounds of discrimination is merely illustrative
and not exhaustive.' Furthermore, article 2's prohibition against
distinctions on the grounds of "other status" may be broad enough
to also prohibit distinctions grounded in citizenship.6'
To give teeth to the principles embodied in the UDHR, the
Commission on Human Rights drafted two treaties-the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)62
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR)." Taken together with the UDHR, these
documents constitute what is now commonly referred to as the
International Bill of Human Rights.'
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR requires each signatory
state "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status."" Article 26
provides that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law."6 The ICCPR does not, however, prohibit all distinctions
based on citizenship. Article 12, paragraph 167 and article 13'
reaffirm the right of a nation to control immigration by law.
60. See Cholewinski, supra note 57, at 178; see also UDHR, supra note 57, art.
2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
61. See UDHR, supra note 57, art. 2.
62. ICCPR, supra note 58. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.
Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRISTIAN SCl.
MONITOR, June 29, 1992, at 19, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/
documents/docl369.html.
63. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. The United States has signed, but has
not ratified, the ICESCR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last
updated Mar. 5, 2011).
64. International Law, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR
HuMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
65. ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 2, 1 1.
66. Id. art. 26.
67. Id. art. 12, 1 1 ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.").
68. Id. art. 13 ("An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with law ... .).
[Vol. 29:279288
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Article 25 explicitly distinguishes citizens from non-citizens,
guaranteeing the right of "[e]very citizen" to take part in public
affairs, vote and hold office, and have access to public service.6 By
implication, non-citizens may be denied those rights specifically
designated for citizens.
The Human Rights Committee, which is a body of
independent experts elected by the U.N. General Assembly and
charged with monitoring implementation of and compliance with
the ICCPR and with providing treaty interpretation," has
provided helpful guidance for reconciling the non-discrimination
norm with articles 12, 13, and 25. Although decisions and
comments of the Human Rights Committee are not binding, its
decisions are considered highly persuasive for treaty
interpretation. Interpreting article 2, paragraph 1, the
Committee found that "[i]n general, the rights set forth in the
Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and
irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness."n
Additionally, according to the Committee, "each one of the rights
of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination
between citizens and aliens" except when "some of the rights
recognized in the Covenant are expressly applicable only to
citizens" (article 25)." The Committee's endorsement of the non-
discrimination norm as the general rule, and citizenship-based
distinctions as the exception, is strongly supported in the plain
language of the treaty. While most of the articles use expansive
language-"[e]very human being has the inherent right to life"
(article 6), "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture" (article 7), and
"[aill persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity" (article 10) 7 -only articles 12, 13, and 25 circumscribe
the enumerated right to specific classes of persons." This suggests
69. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
70. Human Rights Committee, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R
FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011).
71. See Bridget Kessler, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing... No Problem? A
Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 571,
578 (2009).
72. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 15, The Position of Aliens Under
the Covenant (Twenty-Seventh Session, 1986), Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 1, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1, at 18 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
gencomm/hrcoml5.htm.
73. Id. 2.
74. ICCPR, supra note 58, arts. 6, 7, 10 (emphases added).
75. Id. art. 12, 1 ("[elveryone lawfully within the territory of a State"); id. art.
289
Law and Inequality
that the drafters of the treaty knew how to limit the applicability
of rights, but purposely chose to expansively protect "all members
of the human family."
The United States is a party to the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD)."7 Article 1, paragraph 1 defines "racial discrimination"
to mean "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of... impairing the ... enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms . ... "7 But the ICERD makes clear in article 1,
paragraph 2 that its terms do not "apply to distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party ...
between citizens and non-citizens."7 ' Additionally, so long as there
is no discrimination against any particular nationality, ICERD
does not affect a party's laws regarding "nationality, citizenship or
naturalization."o But that does not mean signatory states may
freely discriminate against non-citizens in immigration matters.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
which is the U.N. treaty body charged with ICERD compliance and
interpretation," has repeatedly emphasized that the provisions in
article 1, paragraph 1 "must not be interpreted to detract in any
way from the rights and freedoms recognized . . . in other
instruments, especially the [UDHR, ICESCR, and the ICCPR]." 82
Although a state may control its borders and distinguish between
citizens and non-citizens, the Committee made clear that "human
rights are ... to be enjoyed by all persons," and that "States
parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between
citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the
13 ("[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant");
id. art. 25 ("[elvery citizen").
76. UDHR, supra note 57, pmbl.
77. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]. The United
States ratified the treaty in 1994. International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-2&
chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Mar. 5, 2011).
78. ICERD, supra note 77, art. 1, 1.
79. Id. art. 1, T 2.
80. Id. art. 1, 3.
81. Id. arts. 8, 9.
82. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation 11, On Non-Citizens (Forty-Second Session, 1993), 1 3, U.N. Doc.
A/48/18 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/genrexi.htm.
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extent recognized under international law."'
The non-discrimination norm between citizens and non-
citizens also emanates from other treaties to which the United
States is not a party. Article 2, paragraph 2 of the ICESCR
prohibits discrimination based on "race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."' The Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), which has been ratified by every country in the
world except for the United States and Somalia, similarly contains
language prohibiting discrimination and expansively defines
"child" to mean "every human being below the age of [majority]."
Article 7 of the CRC guarantees the right of every child to be
"registered immediately after birth" and to "acquire a
nationality."' Special protection is urged for children of non-
citizens, who would otherwise be "stateless."" Finally, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) does not distinguish between citizens
and non-citizens in requiring states parties to eliminate
discrimination against women by all appropriate means."
To the extent that distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens are permissible, the distinctions must be proportionate to
achieving a legitimate state objective. This principle of
proportionality is endorsed by the Human Rights Committee in its
interpretation of the ICCPR. In General Recommendation 18, the
Committee found that "not every differentiation of treatment will
constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose
which is legitimate under the Covenant."88 Similarly, interpreting
83. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation 30, Discrimination Against Non-Citizens (Sixty-Fourth Session,
2004), 3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) [hereinafter CERD, General
Recommendation 301, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/
genrec30.html.
84. ICESCR, supra note 63, art. 2, 2; see also DAVID WEISSBRODT, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF NON-
CITIZENS 12 (2006) [hereinafter WEISSBRODT, RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS], available
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/noncitizensen.pdf ("States may
not draw distinctions between citizens and non-citizens as to social and cultural
rights.").
85. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3, (Nov. 20, 1989) (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 7, 1.
87. See Special Rapporteur, supra note 55, 9.
88. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
89. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 18, Non-Discrimination (Thirty-
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ICERD, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination concluded that "differential treatment based on
citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if
the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the
objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied
pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the
achievement of this aim.""
B. Judicial Application of the Non-Discrimination Norm
Those who think that the non-discrimination norm is a
radical idea that will never gain mainstream acceptance may be
surprised to learn that U.S. courts already employ standards
similar to the non-discrimination norm in at least some situations
concerning the rights of non-citizens. Students of constitutional
law are well aware of judicial standards of review used in equal
protection challenges." To the extent that the non-discrimination
norm emanating from international law parallels the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the requirement that
classifications based on citizenship be proportional to a legitimate
objective suggests that such classifications ought to be reviewed
with heightened (intermediate or strict) scrutiny.92
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is
far from clear, the extent to which courts invalidate distinctions
between citizens and non-citizens on equal protection grounds
appears to depend on the subject matter at issue and whether the
actor is a state or the federal government. 93 Over a century ago, in
Seventh Session, 1989), Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 1 13, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/
hrcoml8. htm.
90. CERD, General Recommendation 30, supra note 83, 1 4.
91. Generally speaking, laws that draw classifications based on race are
reviewed under strict scrutiny, and are invalidated unless the government can
show that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
486 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 16th ed. 2007). Courts review
distinctions based on gender under intermediate scrutiny, under which the
government must show that the law is substantially related to an important
government purpose. Id. All other classifications are reviewed under the highly
deferential rational basis standard, and will be upheld if rationally related to any
legitimate government purpose. Id.
92. Admittedly, the non-discrimination norm does not perfectly map onto
ostensibly rigid constitutional rules. While the principle of proportionality does not
appear to require an "important" or "compelling" state objective, the requirement of
proportionality makes rational basis review inappropriate. See id.
93. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 212 (6th ed. 2008) ("[O]ur constitutional law
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins," the Supreme Court made clear that "the
Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens .... [Its]
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction."" In the area of "formal" criminal
punishment such as incarceration, citizens and non-citizens
generally have the same rights.' In the area of public benefits,
state laws that discriminate on the basis of citizenship are
generally invalidated by courts under a heightened standard of
review.97 But federal eligibility requirements for public benefits
seem to be reviewed deferentially and are upheld." For matters
concerning "core immigration powers" such as admission or
deportation grounds, judicial review is largely non-existent,' with
the judiciary deferring to the "plenary power" of Congress to
control immigration."o
relating to immigration may differ from our constitutional law relating to
noncitizen immigrants.").
94. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
95. Id. at 369.
96. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that
immigration authorities lacked the authority to impose criminal punishments
without criminal process). But in recent years, non-citizens facing criminal
penalties for immigration-related offenses are afforded fewer procedural
protections than criminal defendants facing non-immigration charges. See Chac6n,
Managing Migration, supra note 19, at 141-45.
97. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ("[A] State's desire to
preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify
[discrimination against non-citizens]."); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230
(1982) (invalidating a state law denying education to children of undocumented
immigrants).
98. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding residency as an
eligibility requirement for federal benefits for non-citizens).
99. By non-existent judicial review, we mean that the substantive law setting
forth the exclusion or deportation reasoning is reviewed very deferentially. See id.
at 80 (explaining that Congress may make rules for "aliens" that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens and such discrimination based on citizenship is
not necessarily "invidious"). Courts may still review the law to ensure that it
comports with procedural due process requirements. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1492-94 (2010) (reviewing an immigrant's Sixth Amendment claim
and concluding that he was entitled to notice of the deportation consequences
before entering a criminal plea).
100. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) ("[The] plenary
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been
firmly established."); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) ("So long,
however, as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they
remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign
right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our
borders."). There is a vast literature discussing and critiquing the "plenary power
doctrine." See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty,
100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987) ("The doctrine that the Constitution neither
limits governmental control over the admission of aliens nor secures the right of




The non-discrimination norm emanates from principles of
international law under which equality between citizens and non-
citizens is the rule, while distinctions are the exception.o" Even
where permissible, distinctions must be proportional to achieving
a legitimate state objective." The current U.S. deportation
regime eschews proportionality and violates international law.
A. Statutory Deportation Grounds and Discretionary Relief
Although deportation has long been a fixture of U.S.
immigration policy, the number of non-citizens deported has
increased significantly over the last fifteen years. During fiscal
year 1994, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)
deported 45,674 non-citizens, 32,512 of whom had criminal
convictions in the United States." In fiscal year 2009, ICE
deported 393,289 non-citizens, 128,345 of whom had criminal
convictions in the United States." Non-citizens are deportable if
they fall into any one of six general categories that provide
grounds for deportation: (1) inadmissible at time of entry, (2)
convicted of certain criminal offenses, (3) falsified documents or
failed to register, (4) engaged in activities that endanger national
security, (5) became a public charge, or (6) voted unlawfully."'
Legal scholars have described the current deportation regime
as an "on-off switch."" As Juliet Stumpf explains, "[r]egardless of
whether the violation of immigration law is grave or slight,
removal from the country is the statutory consequence," although
additional consequences may be imposed (e.g., fines or
incarceration)."o7  For example, immigration law does not
distinguish between a student who violates the terms of her visa
nativist mood a hundred years ago.").
101. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
103. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 218 tbl.63. Note that not all
deported non-citizens with criminal convictions were deported because of their
criminal conviction; many were removed for other reasons. In fiscal year 1994, for
example, only 24,581 of the non-citizens with criminal convictions were actually
deported on criminal grounds. See id. at 217 tbl.62. The Department has stopped
publishing reasons for non-citizen removal.
104. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
103 tbl.38 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
yearbook/2009/ois-yb 2009.pdf.
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
106. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1690
(2009) [hereinafter Stumpf, Fitting Punishment].
107. Id. at 1691.
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by working more hours than permitted, a recreational user of
marijuana, and a serial arsonist; all are deportable."
Perhaps to temper the potential harshness of the broad
grounds for deportation, the ostensibly "rule-based" deportation
regime has always had a complex overlay of discretion, including
both prosecutorial discretion (setting enforcement priorities) and
adjudicatory discretion in individual cases.'" Relying on § 212(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952,11o which
allowed for discretionary waivers of deportation, immigration
judges and the BIA waived deportation in slightly more than half
of the cases before them between 1989 and 1995.1n Reacting
against this level of discretion by the courts, Congress repealed
§ 212(c) in 1996, replacing it with a far more restrictive
"cancellation of removal." 2 This provision authorizes the Attor-
ney General to cancel the removal of long-term legal permanent
residents if they meet certain statutory time-based require-
ments."' Non-permanent residents, including undocumented
migrants who entered without inspection, may be eligible for can-
cellation of removal if they have been continuously present in the
United States for at least ten years, they are of "good moral char-
acter," and their "removal would result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship" to their citizen (or legal permanent re-
sident) "spouse, parent, or child.""' Unlike some discretionary
waivers, cancellation of removal purges the underlying deportation
ground and restores permanent resident status (or grants it in the
case of undocumented migrants)."'
Yet to the extent that these discretionary forms of relief are
meant to inject some sense of proportionality into the deportation
sanction, the growing convergence between criminal and immi-
gration law has made the exercise of discretion impossible in many
cases that warrant leniency. Nowhere is that more evident than
in the expansion of the term "aggravated felony.""' Congress
108. Id.
109. Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611,
611 (2006).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
111. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295-96 n.5 (2001); Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders, supra note 3, at 1845.
112. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 3, at 1845; see INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2006).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
114. Id. § 1229b(b).
115. See Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, supra note 106, at 1695.
116. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 601, 610 (2010).
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introduced the concept of "aggravated felony" in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), making it grounds for deportation and
mandatory immigration detention."' When first introduced, the
term was narrowly defined, covering only serious crimes such as
murder and the trafficking of drugs or weapons." After numerous
amendments and additions by Congress, an aggravated felony
today need not be either aggravated or felonious."9 The list of
state and federal crimes now constituting aggravated felonies in-
cludes crimes of violence, theft, receipt of stolen property, money
laundering, racketeering and some gambling offenses, financial
fraud, forgery, tax evasion, and commercial bribery."' Whether
many of the crimes constitute aggravated felonies turns on whe-
ther the maximum possible sentence is at least one year impri-
sonment, regardless of the actual sentence imposed or served."'
Unlike deportation for crimes of moral turpitude, non-citizens
convicted of an aggravated felony may be deported regardless of
the length of the criminal sentence or when the offense was
committed."' More importantly perhaps, non-citizens convicted of
aggravated felonies are barred from almost all "avenues of
discretionary relief' including cancellation of removal, § 1182(h)
waivers,"' and even asylum, making deportation categorical.124
Because Congress made application of the deportation laws
retroactive, non-citizens sometimes face deportation for
misdemeanors committed years earlier. Consider, for example,
the well-publicized case of Mary Anne Gehris. Ms. Gehris was a
legal permanent resident and had lived in the United States since
she was an infant."' In 1988, acting on the advice of a public
defender, she pled guilty to a misdemeanor for pulling another
woman's hair and received a one-year suspended sentence."'
117. Id. at 609-10.
118. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 484.
119. See id. at 484-85.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006).
121. Id.; see also Legomsky, supra note 3, at 485 ("From its humble origins, the
aggravated felony definition now has twenty-one subparts, and the new prongs are
generally applied retroactively to individuals who committed the crimes before
Congress made them aggravated felonies.").
122. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006).
123. Id. § 1182(h) (giving the Attorney General discretion to waive the
inadmissibility standards in limited circumstances).
124. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 483. For non-citizens who have been
convicted of certain aggravated felonies, even withholding of removal is prohibited
as a discretionary form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006).
125. See Anthony Lewis, A Measure of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al3.
126. Id.
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When Congress expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" in
1996 and made the expansion retroactive, her misdemeanor hair-
pulling became a "crime of violence," and because it carried a
sentence of one year imprisonment, she was deportable as an
aggravated felon even though she had served no jail time. "
Under immigration law, she was ineligible for discretionary relief;
only a pardon from the Georgia Board of Pardons saved Ms.
Gehris from the threat of deportation.128
Today we have a deportation regime that can be both
categorical and harsh. The system is categorical in that, in many
cases, immigration judges and officials lack the authority to stay
deportation and are prohibited from considering the impact of
deportation on the non-citizen's spouse or minor children.12' The
system is harsh in that deportation often destroys families as
parents are frequently separated from their minor children,
leaving them with serious psychological trauma.so For example,
one year after Gerardo Antonio Mosquera was deported to
Colombia, his eldest son, who was just seventeen years old,
committed suicide."' Mr. Mosquera, who was a legal permanent
resident for twenty-nine years, was deported for selling ten dollars
worth of marijuana to a paid police informant, even though he
spent just ninety days in jail, had a U.S.-citizen spouse, and had
four U.S.-citizen children. 3 2 And because non-citizens who have
been convicted of an aggravated felony are permanently barred
from returning to the United States (unless the Attorney General
consents to their re-entry),"' Mr. Mosquera was not able to attend
127. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1943
(2000).
128. See Lewis, supra note 125, at A13.
129. In 1990, Congress eliminated the authority of state and federal judges to
issue binding "judicial recommendations against deportation" during sentencing.
Legomsky, supra note 3, at 498. Creating yet another asymmetry, Congress vested
federal judges with the authority to order deportation in 1996. See id. at 498-99.
130. Morawetz, supra note 127, at 1951. Morawetz states that:
The current system of mandatory detention and mandatory deportation
seriously undermines these family values.. . . The family may now be
without a breadwinner; the family members left behind may face eviction
due to their inability to make mortgage or rent payments. ... When the
deportation order becomes final, the system forces many of these families
to separate permanently.
Id.
131. Patrick J. McDonnell, Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1998, at B1.
132. Id. at B3.
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2006).
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his son's funeral."' According to Human Rights Watch, an
estimated one million innocent spouses and minor children "have
been separated from [their] loved ones [because ofJ deportations on
criminal grounds since 1997."" More than seventy percent of the
non-citizens deported "were expelled from the United States for
non-violent offenses."'
B. The Non-Discrimination Norm and International Law
The current U.S. deportation regime is inconsistent with the
non-discrimination norm. Under international law, nations have
the right to control their borders and to subject non-citizens to
deportation."' But the right to expel lawfully admitted non-
citizens is not unqualified. International law recognizes that
citizens and non-citizens alike have the right to be free from
"arbitrary or unlawful interference with [their] privacy, family,
[and] home."'" Moreover, because "family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society," it is "entitled to protection by
society and the State."'" Thus, the rights of the state to protect its
borders and to prevent crime must be balanced against the non-
citizen's right to family life, which is guaranteed by the ICCPR
and other human rights instruments.4 0
According to the Human Rights Committee, the deportation
of a non-citizen is permissible, but the decision must (1) be made
"under law in furtherance of a legitimate state interest," and (2)
give "due consideration . .. to the deportee's family connections."'
Regional courts interpreting similar provisions in the European
Convention on Human Rights 4 2 and the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration)'" have
134. McDonnell, supra note 131, at B3.
135. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS
DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 4 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/node/82173.
136. Id. at 2.
137. See ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 13; ICERD, supra note 77, art. 1, T 3.
138. ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 17, 1.
139. Id. art. 23, 1.
140. See id.; ICESCR, supra note 63, art. 10.
141. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada, Judgment of December
1996, No. 538/1993, 12.10.
142. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
143. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), arts. V
& VI, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92 doc.31 rev.3, at 19 (1996).
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generally required states to strike a "fair balance between the
right to family life . . . and the state's legitimate interest in the
prevention of disorder or crime and the guarantee of public safety
. . . ." " For example, in Beldjoudi v. France,4 1 the European
Court of Human Rights held that the deportation of a man with a
lengthy criminal record to Algeria interfered with his right to
family life and was disproportionate to the state objective of main-
taining a democratic society and public order."*
Recently in the case of Wayne Smith, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) found that the United
States' categorical deportation laws violated rights embodied in
the American Declaration, including the right to family life and
the rights of the child. 47  Smith, who was born in Trinidad and
Tobago, had lived in the United States since he was ten years old
and had been a legal permanent resident since 1974.'4 In 1990,
Smith pled guilty to drug possession and attempted distribution. 49
After serving three years in state prison, Smith was denied the
opportunity to apply for humanitarian relief despite serious
financial and emotional hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife, who was
undergoing cancer treatment, and his U.S.-citizen child. 5o The
IACHR noted that in the area of deportation, "neither the scope of
[the] action of the State nor the rights of a non-citizen are
absolute.""' Instead, states must employ a "balancing test, which
weighs a State's legitimate interest to protect and promote the
general welfare against a non-citizen resident's fundamental
rights such as to family life.""' Where there are children involved,
the IACHR continued, the state must consider "the best interest
and well-being of the children of a non-citizen ... in a removal
proceeding.""' Because Smith was denied the "opportunity to
144. Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and
Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 304
(2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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present a humanitarian defense to deportation or to have [his]
rights to family duly considered before deportation," the United
States violated his rights under the American Declaration."'
Rather than requiring that deportation laws be proportional
to achieving a legitimate government interest, for over a century
U.S. courts have deferred to Congress's plenary power to deport
non-citizens. In 1892, Congress enacted legislation that
authorized the deportation of any Chinese non-citizen who was
unable to obtain a "certificate of residence," which required an
affidavit signed by at least one "credible white witness.""' The
Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that "the right of a nation
to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized. . . ,
is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entrance into the country.""' Non-citizens, according to the
Court, "remain subject to the power of Congress to expel them, or
to order them to be removed and deported from the country,
whenever in its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient
for the public interest.""' Decades later, relying on similar
reasoning, the Supreme Court upheld a law that provided for the
deportation of any non-citizen who was a member of the
Communist Party at any time after entering the United States."
The categorical approach to deportation, which has in recent
years been accelerated by the growing convergence of criminal and
immigration law in the United States,'"' violates the non-discri-
mination norm. Although only non-citizens may be deported, it is
not deportation itself that violates the non-discrimination norm,
but rather the categorical approach employed under current law."'
Compliance with the spirit of the non-discrimination norm re-
quires an individualized balancing test that looks at the non-
citizen's ties to the United States, the lack of ties to his or her
country of nationality, and the seriousness of the crime for which
he or she is being deported."' In many cases, especially those in-
volving the retroactive application of the aggravated felony stat-
154. Id. 1 59.
155. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 727 (1893).
156. Id. at 707. Of course, as the Court admitted, Chinese non-citizens could not
apply for naturalization. Id. at 716.
157. Id. at 724.
158. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592-95 (1951).
159. See Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, supra note 106, at 1720.
160. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 498.
161. Cf Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, supra note 106, at 1732-38 (proposing a
"proportionate system of sanctions for immigration violations" that involves
consideration of the listed factors).
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ute, deportation fails to advance a legitimate state objective (such
as crime prevention), while imposing harsh personal consequences
on non-citizens and their families.162 Aggressive congressional ef-
forts to act tough on immigration policy have eliminated all discre-
tionary relief, thereby preventing immigration officials from trying
to ensure proportionality even in the most compelling cases.1
IV. Mandatory Immigration Detention
As Congress criminalized more immigration-related offenses
and expanded the number of criminal offenses triggering
categorical deportation, the number of non-citizens in detention on
any given day soared nearly six-fold between 1994 and 2008 (from
6785 to 33,400).'" Today, ICE runs the largest detention system
in the country.'65 In 2008, ICE detained 378,582 non-citizens,
representing an eighty-seven percent jump from 2002.'66 ICE's
budget for "custody" leapt from $860 million in fiscal year 2005 to
$1.72 billion in fiscal year 2009.167
A. Types of Immigration Detention
The statutory scheme authorizing the detention of non-
citizens is extraordinarily complex." Two federal agencies-the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security-are responsible
for administering at least three different statutes depending on
the situation.' 6 For non-citizens arriving at a port of entry who
are deemed "inadmissible" on certain grounds (e.g., fraudulent
documents), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) authorizes expedited removal and
detention pending a "determination of credible fear."o For non-
162. See id. at 1733-38; McDonnell, supra note 131, at B1, B3.
163. Morawetz, supra note 127, at 1951-54. Harm to a criminal defendant's
family is rarely a mitigating factor in sentencing. See McDonnell, supra note 131,
at B1, B3. But recall that deportation, according to the Supreme Court, is not a
criminal punishment. See Chac6n, Managing Migration, supra note 19, at 140-41.
The non-citizen's family has already been punished collaterally when the non-
citizen serves prison time for committing a crime; deportation adds further harm.
See McDonnell, supra note 131, at B1.
164. DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 6 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.
org/pubs/detentionreportSeptl009.pdf.
165. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009).
166. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 164, at 7 fig.2.
167. Id. at 7-8.
168. Id.
169. See Heeren, supra note 116, at 609.
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006).
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citizens legally present in the United States, § 1231(a) authorizes
detention while the non-citizen awaits actual removal following a
final deportation order."' And lastly, § 1226 authorizes detention
while a non-citizen's deportation case is adjudicated."' Detention
during deportation proceedings can be either discretionary under
§ 1226(a),"' or mandatory under § 1226(c)."'
1. Detention Pursuant to Expedited Removal
In 1996, as part of IIRIRA, Congress created an "expedited
removal" process that mandates detention for all non-citizens
arriving without proper travel documents and empowers immi-
gration officers to order their immediate removal unless the non-
citizen "indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a
fear of persecution.""' If the non-citizen maintains a fear of
return, the non-citizen is sent to a detention facility, where an asy-
lum officer conducts a "credible fear interview.""' Although non-
citizens are entitled to "consult" with anyone prior to the interview
(at no expense to the government),"' consultation must take place
at the detention site."' Under this statutory scheme, even non-
citizens who are found to have a credible fear of persecution in
their country of origin remain detained during the asylum process
unless they are granted discretionary parole."' Although it is
difficult to know exactly how many of the over 30,000 non-citizens
currently detained are asylum seekers, at least 48,000 asylum
seekers have been detained since 2003.8o
The practice of detaining asylum seekers has been sharply
criticized by legal scholars and non-governmental organizations
alike.'"' Among other things, mandatory detention of persons with
171. Id. § 1231(a)(2).
172. Id. § 1226(a).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 1226(c).
175. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
176. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2010).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv) (2006).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). In 2003, the grant of parole rate varied from 0.5% in
New Orleans to 97.6% in Harlingen, Texas. U. S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: VOLUME I
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (2005). According to Human Rights First, the
parole rate for asylum seekers who passed the "credible fear interview" dropped
from 66.6% in 2004 to 4.5% in 2007. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 54, at 6.
180. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 54, at 16, 17.
181. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing criticism of a detention facility by refugee
advocacy groups and local community and faith-based groups); Brand & Lundholm,
supra note 54, at 154-55 (describing disagreement among legal commentators on
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legitimate fears of persecution risks re-traumatizing those who are
already in a psychologically frail state.12 Additionally, detention
makes it harder for asylum seekers to establish their eligibility for
asylum, gather evidence, and secure legal representation."*
Finally, to the extent that mandatory detention penalizes and
deters refugees from seeking relief in the United States, the
practice is inconsistent with the United States' obligation under
article 31, paragraph 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which prohibits states from penalizing refugees for their
illegal entry or presence, and article 9 of the ICCPR, which
prohibits arbitrary detention."
2. Post-Final Deportation Order Detention
Under § 1231, removal after a final order of deportation must
generally occur within ninety days, during which time detention is
mandatory."' If the non-citizen cannot be removed within the
ninety-day period, § 1231(a)(3) authorizes the Attorney General, at
his or her discretion, to release the non-citizen under super-
vision. " In the case of "inadmissible or criminal aliens,"
§ 1231(a)(6) provides that the Attorney General "may" detain the
non-citizen "beyond the removal period.""' In the landmark case
of Zadvydas v. Davis,'" the Supreme Court addressed whether
§ 1236(a)(6) authorized the indefinite detention of a non-citizen
who, although ordered deported for drug-related crimes, could not
be removed.'" In a five-four decision, the majority of the Court
found that because the indefinite detention of lawfully admitted
whether the detention of asylum seekers constitutes a violation of the Refugee
Convention); Karen M. Jarvis Johnson, Fearing the United States: Rethinking
Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 589, 592 (2007)
("challeng[ing] the current policy and regulations behind mandatory detention for
defensive asylum seekers").
182. See Johnson, supra note 181, at 604 ("The psychological impact of detention
can be devastating to many asylum seekers who are experiencing anxiety,
depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.").
183. HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 54, at 7. According to one study, detained
mothers seeking asylum are more likely to give up their asylum struggle in order to
be reunited with their children. See Brand & Lundholm, supra note 54, at 159.
184. ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 9, 1 ("Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.");
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 31, 1, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2006) ("During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.").
186. Id. § 1231(a)(3).
187. Id. § 1231(a)(6).
188. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
189. Id. at 682, 684.
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non-citizens "would raise serious constitutional concerns,"
§ 1231(a)(6) must be construed to "contain an implicit 'reasonable
time' limitation."" Today, detentions of less than six months from
the time of the final deportation order are presumptively consti-
tutional and long-term detentions are limited to special
circumstances by federal regulations. 9' Although Zadvydas
generated a flurry of debate and discussion by legal scholars, 9'
comparatively few non-citizens actually face indefinite detention;
the detention of non-citizens for the duration of their deportation
proceedings, authorized under § 1226, is far more common.19
3. Detention Pending Deportation Proceedings
The concept of mandatory detention during one's deportation
proceeding did not exist until the passage of the ADAA in 1988.1"
In addition to creating a new "aggravated felony" ground for
deportation,'9' the ADAA required that non-citizens convicted of
an aggravated felony be detained without a bond hearing during
their deportation proceedings." Today, § 1226(a) provides that
"an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." 7
Non-citizens detained under this section may be eligible for
"conditional parole" or release on a bond of at least $1500.1"
Despite the discretion built into the statute, very few non-citizens
are released pending the determination of their immigration
190. Id. at 682.
191. Id. at 701. A few years later, the Court extended the implicit reasonable
time limitation interpretation of § 1236(a)(6) to inadmissible non-citizens. See
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005).
192. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning
and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 387 (2002) (stating
that long term detention usually only results from criminal conviction); Rachel
Canty, The New World of Immigration Custody Determinations After Zadvydas v.
Davis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 467, 479 (2004) (discussing disagreement on whether
the Zadvydas decision applies to all aliens); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due
Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1039 (2002)
[hereinafter Cole, Due Process Limits] (stating that immigration detention
standards should be governed by civil due process principles).
193. More than half of all non-citizens in immigration detention have pending
removal cases. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 164, at 16. But on January 25, 2009,
there were nearly one thousand non-citizens who had been detained longer than six
months following the receipt of their final deportation order. Id. at 17.
194. Heeren, supra note 116, at 610.
195. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
196. Heeren, supra note 116, at 610.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
198. Id.; see also Heeren, supra note 116, at 611 (describing the parole
possibilities for detained immigrants under § 1226(a)).
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status. In fiscal year 2010, ICE projected it would detain 400,000
people compared to approximately 23,000 who were offered
alternatives to detention."
In addition to discretionary detention, § 1226(c) commands
the Attorney General to detain (without bond eligibility) any non-
citizen who is either inadmissible or deportable because of certain
criminal convictions including "aggravated felonies"2 " and crimes
of moral turpitude.20' A non-citizen wishing to challenge his or her
classification as falling within the mandatory detention provisions
of § 1226(c) is afforded a Joseph hearing, where he or she bears the
burden to prove that ICE "is substantially unlikely to establish, at
the merits hearing . .. the charge or charges that ... subject the
alien to mandatory detention."2" If the non-citizen succeeds, he or
she receives a bond hearing. If the non-citizen fails and is found to
be "properly included in the mandatory detention category," 2 03 then
no individual determination of dangerousness or flight risk is
permitted.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
mandatory detention scheme of § 1226(c), at least in the case of
non-citizens who concede their deportability, in Demore v. Kim. 205
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, unlike the
indefinite detention faced by the non-citizens in Zadvydas, where
deportation was "no longer practically attainable,"206 Kim's deten
tion had a definite end-point: the end of the deportation proceed-
ing.207 Despite this holding, however, lower courts have distin-
guished Kim, requiring individualized bond hearings for non-
citizens detained for long periods of time.208
199. See MIDWEST COAL. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., YEAR ONE REPORT CARD:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S IMMIGRATION DETENTION
REFORMS 7 (2010), available at http://www.midwesthumanrights.org/sites/
midwesthumanrights.org/files/ICE%20report%20card%20FULL%20FINAL%20201
0%2010%2006.pdf [hereinafter REPORT CARD].
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006).
201. Although critically important in immigration proceedings, the term "crime
of moral turpitude" is not defined by statute. Over the years, the BIA has defined
the term to mean "an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically
wrong." In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (BIA 1999).
202. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (BIA 1999).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 802.
205. 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
206. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
207. Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-28.
208. See Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947-48 (9th
Cir. 2008) (construing the mandatory detention statute to authorize detention only
for a reasonable period, after which detention reverts to discretionary detention
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B. The Non-Discrimination Norm and International Law
Mandatory immigration detention violates the general rule
that citizens and non-citizens facing similar forms of detention
ought to be afforded the same protections. If we can make the case
that mandatory immigration detention is actually "punitive"
notwithstanding its "administrative" label, then this form of
incarceration violates the non-discrimination norm because only
non-citizens are so punished without the procedural protections
enshrined in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments."
Immigration law has long distinguished between
administrative or preventive detention and punitive incarceration
as a form of punishment. In Wong Wing v. United States,210 the
Supreme Court was careful to distinguish "temporary
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the
provisions for the exclusion or expulsion," from punitive
incarceration."' Non-citizens, like citizens, cannot be criminally
punished without the protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.212 This distinction remains intact today.213
Yet despite the technical difference between punitive incar-
ceration and immigration detention, the Department of Homeland
Security acknowledges that detainees in both systems "tend to be
seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations
are typically managed in similar ways."24 Of the over 30,000 de-
tainees currently in immigration detention, most (sixty-eight per-
cent) are held in state prisons or local jails pursuant to Inter-
governmental Service Agreements (ISA), while another seventeen
percent are held in private contract detention facilities.215 Many of
the ISA facilities are county jails in isolated locations, where
under § 1226(a)); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe INS may
detain prima facie removable criminal aliens, without bond, for a reasonable period
of time required to initiate and conclude removal proceedings promptly [but wihen
actual removal is not reasonably foreseeable, deportable aliens may not be
indefinitely detained without a government showing of a 'strong special
justification' . . ).
209. See infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
210. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
211. Id. at 235 ("Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused
could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character and while
arrangements were being made for their deportation."); see also Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) ("Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation
procedure.").
212. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
213. SCHRIRO, supra note 165, at 4 ("As a matter of law, Immigration Detention
is unlike Criminal Incarceration.").
214. Id.
215. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 164, at 8-9.
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immigrant detainees are mixed with the general criminal popula-
tion and have little access to supportive services or legal counsel.216
Although ICE has promulgated (but not codified) National
Detention Standards prescribing detainee services, detention
center staff remain "ignorant about the distinction between
administrative detention and punitive custody."2 17 According to
one report, "when interviewed by the Office of Inspector General,
five Bureau of Prison (BOP) officials did not know that standards
specifically applicable to ICE detainees existed, and so corrections
officers were trained to treat detainees the same as inmates."2
Nongovernmental organizations have strongly criticized the
poor conditions in which ICE detains non-citizens awaiting deter-
mination of immigration status. These deficiencies include medi-
cal neglect of those who are ill and lack of specialized treatment
for vulnerable individuals, including those suffering from mental
health problems (such as torture victims), women who are preg-
nant, and children.' Immigrants in detention generally wear the
same prison garb as criminal inmates, eat the same food, have the
same limited access to recreation and fresh air, and speak to their
visitors through the same Plexiglas-encased video monitors.220
The similarities between immigration detention and punitive
incarceration are not limited to similar holding facilities. As the
criminal and immigration spheres converge, immigration deten-
tion has become an integral part of the government's overall en-
forcement strategy-one that employs policy assumptions tradi-
tionally found in criminal law.2 21  In particular, the current
practice of detaining asylum seekers who arrive at ports of entry
without proper documentation (expedited removal) appears to be
mostly driven by a deterrence rationale.222 According to the Office
of Detention and Removal's strategic plan, "[tihe National Stra-
216. REPORT CARD, supra note 199, at 9.
217. Brand & Lundholm, supra note 54, at 161-62.
218. Id.at 162.
219. See REPORT CARD, supra note 199, at 14, 16, 21.
220. See, e.g., In His Own Words: Abby's Story, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK
(July 16, 2010), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2722 (describing the
conditions of confinement in detention).
221. See Brand & Lundholm, supra note 54, at 151 ("One of the main reasons for
[Department of Homeland Security's] and ICE's reliance on a detention strategy,
even in the absence of a formally articulated policy, is the rationale of deterrence
that underlies the entire system.").
222. See id. at 150-51; Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A
Proposal for Ending the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM.




tegy for Homeland Security promotes a balanced and integrated
enforcement strategy, which ensures that the probability of appre-
hension and the impact of the consequences are sufficient to deter
future illegal activity."223
Even if we assume that immigration detention is truly pre-
ventive in nature,"' the mandatory detention of legislatively
decreed classes of non-citizens, without individualized determina-
tions of need, still violates the non-discrimination norm and
international law.2 2 5 Recall that under § 1226(c), certain "criminal
aliens" are mandatorily detained without a bond hearing for the
duration of their deportation cases. 26 Detention under this statute
can last for months or even years, yet because detention is preven-
tive rather than punitive, procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants and arrestees facing incarceration do not apply."'
However, because of our fundamental right to be free from govern-
ment confinement, even preventive detention must satisfy the Due
Process Clause.2 2 8 In a manner repugnant to the non-discrimina-
tion norm, the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence
requires significantly fewer protections for non-citizens compared
to citizens.22 9
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that "government
detention violates [due process] unless the detention is ordered in
a criminal proceeding ... or, in certain special and narrow
nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as
harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
223. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ENDGAME: OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC
PLAN, 2003-2012, at ii (2003), available at http://www.aclum.org/pdflendgame.pdf.
224. Cole, Due Process Limits, supra note 192, at 1006 ("Immigration detention
is by definition 'preventive' because the INS has no authority to detain for punitive
purposes.").
225. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006); Brand & Lundholm, supra note 54, at 150-
52.
226. According to ICE, of the 31,075 non-citizens in detention facilities on
September 1, 2009, sixty-six percent were subject to the mandatory detention
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See SCHRIRO, supra note 165, at 6.
227. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 489, 518.
228. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.");
see also Cole, Due Process Limits, supra note 192, at 1006 ("[Plrecisely because
preventive detention involves depriving individuals of their physical liberty without
an adjudication of criminal guilt, its use is strictly circumscribed by due process
constraints.").
229. See Cole, Due Process Limits, supra note 192, at 1014-15.
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restraint."230 While the Supreme Court has upheld preventive
detention in the criminal bail, material witness,"' and civil
commitment contexts,232 it has been careful to balance the
government's interest with the individual's right to personal
liberty."' After reviewing the constitutional landscape for
preventive detention, David Cole identified three general
principles common to constitutionally permissible preventive
detention regimes: (1) the detention must be non-punitive, (2) the
detention must have "an articulable endpoint" or be "temporally
limited," and (3) generally speaking, "the justification for detention
must be particularized to the individual.""'
Consider, for example, the Bail Reform Act, which authorizes
the government to detain arrestees without bail because of flight
risk or danger to the community."' In United States v. Salerno,"'
the Supreme Court upheld the Act, emphasizing the government's
compelling interest in preventing crime, and that the defendant's
"strong interest in liberty" is protected by the government's burden
to "convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the
safety of the community or any person."3 In addition to
dismissing the substantive due process challenge, the Court also
dismissed the procedural due process objection, observing that the
detainee has the right to counsel, to proffer evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, and to immediate appellate review.238
The justifications for preventive detention of non-citizens
pending their deportation proceedings are virtually identical to
those for arrestees-both are ostensibly non-punitive as the
government's interests in preventing flight and protecting the
community are the same for both groups.23 1 Yet the non-citizen
facing immigration detention receives far fewer due process
protections, both substantive and procedural.240 In Kim, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion dispensed with
230. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
231. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953).
232. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
233. Id.
234. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 708 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, Preventive Detention].
235. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).
236. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
237. Id. at 750.
238. Id. at 751-52.
239. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 490.
240. Id. at 518, 523-24.
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individualized bond hearings, finding sufficient justification in a
congressional report that noted "more than 20% of deportable
criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings" once
released, and that cited supposedly high rates of recidivism for
released "criminal aliens."241 The majority also seemed swayed by
reports that "in the majority of cases, [post-removal-period
detention] lasts for less than the 90 days we considered
presumptively valid in Zadvydas."2 42  In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy took solace in the fact that non-citizens have
procedural protections because they are entitled to a hearing in
which they may challenge their inclusion in the mandatory
detention category.2' But unlike the Bail Reform Act, where the
government must prove particularized dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence in an adversarial setting in which the arrestee
is provided counsel, 2" under Joseph the non-citizen detainee has
the burden to prove (without guaranteed counsel) that ICE "is
substantially unlikely to establish at the merits hearing ... the
charge or charges that ... subject the alien to mandatory
detention."2" Even if immigration detention were non-punitive,
non-citizens' lack of substantive and procedural protections is
repugnant to the non-discrimination norm.2"
Although distinctions between citizens and non-citizens are
permissible to the extent that they are proportional to achieving a
legitimate state objective, there is no legitimate government
objective that justifies this degree of discrimination. 2 ' The
government has an interest in ensuring that the non-citizen will
appear at the deportation proceeding and a duty to protect the
community from additional criminal activity. 2" But those
circumstances alone do not justify treating non-citizens in the
241. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519 (2003).
242. Id. at 529.
243. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (2006).
245. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (BIA 1999). As one Court of Appeals
judge observed, "the Joseph standard is not just unconstitutional, it is egregiously
so. The standard not only places the burden on the defendant to prove that he
should not be physically detained, it makes that burden all but insurmountable."
Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).
246. In what amounts to a direct repudiation of the non-discrimination norm,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Kim justified the unequal treatment
of non-citizens by noting that "[iun the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." Kim, 538 U.S. at 521 (quoting Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
247. Cole, Preventive Detention, supra note 234, at 719.
248. Id.
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immigration setting worse than citizens awaiting a criminal
trial."' As Cole observes, "[t]he immigrant facing a deportation
hearing and the criminal defendant awaiting trial have identical
interests in not being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty," while
"the government has identical interests in detaining the
immigrant and the criminal defendant if they pose a risk of flight
or a danger to the community."2" Why treat them differently?
Arguments grounded in considerations of judicial economy or
efficiency are equally unpersuasive. First, it is not clear that effi-
ciency is, by itself, a legitimate government interest, nor does
efficiency alone explain why criminal arrestees have compara-
tively more protection than non-citizens facing § 1226(c) deten-
tion.251 In the procedural due process context, the government's
interest in efficiency is only one of three factors to be considered.252
Other factors include the individual's liberty (or property) interest
and the risk of error.2" Second, in terms of substantive due
process, the Supreme Court has never found efficiency to be a
justification for the deprivation of a fundamental right.2 5
Even assuming that the government has a legitimate interest
in immigration detention, the current regime, like that of
categorical deportation, has no sense of proportionality. The
mandatory detention of an entire class of non-citizens (including,
but not limited to, aggravated felons) is drastically over-inclusive.
Possession of stolen bus transfers2 5 or issuing bad checks 256 are
examples of criminal convictions that trigger mandatory detention
under § 1226(c).257 As Justice Souter noted in dissent, "[dietention
is not limited to dangerous criminal aliens or those found likely to
flee, but applies to all aliens claimed to be deportable for criminal
convictions, even where the underlying offenses are minor."25 8
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("[T]he Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they
were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy. . . .").
252. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
253. Id.
254. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
255. Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2000).
256. Matter of Bart, 20 I. & N. Dec. 436, 437, (BIA 1992).





Courts have long looked to international law in deciding
immigration questions.2 59 In upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act,
the Supreme Court relied on international theories of state
sovereignty, noting that "[l]urisdiction over its own territory to
that extent is an incident of every independent nation."26o In Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,"' Justice Gray relied on English and
French law as well as the law of nations in upholding Congress's
plenary deportation power.262 And in the twentieth century,
Justice Jackson was convinced that "[deportation] is a weapon of
defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power
inherent in every sovereign state."2' As we have demonstrated in
this Article, far from justifying the banishment and detention of
non-citizens, international law commands general equality
between citizens and non-citizens, and requires distinctions to be
proportional to a legitimate state objective.' As the boundary
between criminal and immigration law has eroded in recent years,
an ever-increasing number of non-citizens find themselves facing
harsh-and we believe punitive-sanctions without the procedural
protections afforded to criminal defendants and arrestees.26' The
Obama administration has pledged to promote a different set of
priorities in civil immigration enforcement especially with regard
to apprehension, detention, and deportation. We remain
cautiously optimistic that all branches of government will consider
the obligations of international law and the non-discrimination
norm as the United States continues to strive for fair and humane
enforcement of immigration laws.
259. See generally David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and
Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 645-53 (2006) (describing
the influence international law has had in U.S. courts, not as binding authority,
but as a guide for statutory or constitutional interpretation).
260. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
603 (1889); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It
is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners . . . .").
261. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
262. Id. at 707-11.
263. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952).
264. See supra Part II.
265. See supra Part IV.B.
266. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, to All ICE Employees, available at http://www.immilaw.
com/FAQ/ICE%20prosecution%20priorities%202010.pdf (posted June 29, 2010).
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